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Abstract 
 Due to the effects of climate change, natural disasters are beginning to occur 
more frequently and are causing greater destruction. The American disaster relief 
system currently relies on a nationally focused, top-down approach. As resources 
become more and more limited, it is expected that disaster relief fatigue will occur, 
required local communities to take a larger role in their disaster relief processes. 
Right now, major player in both local and national disaster relief are Faith-Based 
Organizations (FBOs), who provide many crucial services before and after disasters 
 
 This paper develops an economic model of the rebuilding stage of disaster 
relief in order to examine the prioritization and resource allocation problems it 
faces. Through a series of case studies, the model is applied and used to point out a 
series of systems and methods by which local FBOs have, and might further be able 
to play larger and more significant roles in disaster relief.
 2 
Executive Summary  
 
Natural disasters occur when natural hazards, which are “severe and 
extreme weather and climate events that occur naturally in all parts of the world” 
(WMO, n.d.) interact with human society, creating damage and destruction. Since 
ancient Rome, human society has worked to respond to and recover from disasters, 
creating systems usually based around a central government, but involving 
numerous non-profit organizations that play equally vital roles. In the United States, 
FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, coordinates disaster relief on 
behalf of the federal government, while numerous organizations including the 
American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and other members of the National Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) community serve as nonprofit actors. 
 
Disaster relief occurs in a series of stages: Mitigation and preparation, which 
aim to reduce the effects of future or impending disasters; response, which focuses 
on the immediate aftermath of a disaster – rescuing survivors, tending to the 
wounded, providing food and shelter, and restoring basic social services like utilities 
and running water; rebuilding, which centers on the rebuilding of private homes 
and businesses and takes about 3-5 years; and, recovery, which is the long-term 
process of restoring infrastructure and “helping communities heal and return to a 
state that is similar to, or even improved from, pre-disaster conditions” (NYDIS, 
2014a). 
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As climate change affects the global temperature and sea levels, natural 
hazards are expected to become more frequent – more heat waves, hurricanes, and 
floods – and as human society becomes more vulnerable because of the same effects 
of climate change, these natural hazards are expect to become larger and more 
powerful disasters when they collide with human society. Because of this increased 
burden on society, disaster relief fatigue is expected to develop as national attention 
and response cannot be focused one each and every disaster. Therefore, 
communities will need to develop local solutions for disaster relief. 
 
Already operating as major players in the local and national disaster relief 
scene are Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), which range from massive nonprofits 
like the Salvation Army, to local churches and religious groups. Due to a number of 
factors, including the moral impetus to help the needy imparted by every major faith 
tradition, the organization flexibility and capacity to shift focus to provide for the 
needs of a community after a disaster, and often the physical space or financial 
strength to provide key resources for their local communities, FBOs are important 
players in disaster relief, and as disaster relief fatigue pushes the burden onto local 
communities, FBOs will be able to bear a significant portion of the responsibility. 
 
Resource distribution becomes a major issue in the rebuilding phase of 
disaster relief, something handled almost exclusively by local organizations. Various 
phases of rebuilding a home require different amounts of resources and labor, and 
 4 
central organizing case management organizations must make decisions about 
where to allocate resources. These resources are allocated based on a perception of 
need, which is itself a function of vulnerability of the family and the damage to the 
home in question. National organizations often don’t have the information to be able 
to understand which homes are more vulnerable than other, and instead use a need 
threshold level to distribute resources when they are in charge; conversely, many 
local organizations lack the proper training to understand the damage levels of 
these homes, and focus their prioritization on their understanding of local families 
vulnerabilities. 
 
In the case that an organization can properly identify both damage and 
vulnerability levels, it becomes clear that a triage-based case management system 
would prioritize homes with high degrees of damage that belong to highly 
vulnerable families, and that low vulnerability families with superficially damaged 
homes can wait to have their homes repaired. Thus, the remaining homes are 
prioritized based on the community’s collective, unspoken preferences for providing 
reconstruction. 
 
A number of different FBOs that operate on the local scale for rebuilding can 
provide insight into how to handle prioritization and resource distribution. Some, 
like ServeMoore, found ways to use resources that were in excess to repair homes 
that would otherwise have to wait, or that were not traditionally helped as a part of 
the disaster relief system yet could not completely recover on their own. Other 
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organizations, such as the Baptist and Methodist churches, provide hierarchy and 
training to help facilitate responses on a local scale. No matter what the method, 
these case studies show that by focusing on local organization’s strengths, 
communities can find ways to reduce their need for national support, thus creating 
systems resistant to disaster relief fatigue. 
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Preface: What Started it All 
 
 
This project all began with the Hillel at Syracuse University Alternative 
Spring Break program I participated in back in March 2013. Myself and 10 other 
students joined the Jewish Disaster Response Corps (JDRC) for five days of work in 
Joplin, MO, helping the community rebuild and recover from the devastating 
tornado that ripped the city apart that previous May. In addition to week of flooring, 
spackling and putting up molding, we met with survivors, first responders, and 
social service providers. Combined with a driving tour of the hardest hit areas, and 
videos of the storm it self, their stories hit home. 
 
As my emotional connection to this community grew, I began to notice 
patterns in what it was we were actually doing there. We were staying in the 
basement of an Evangelical Church, where the bunks had been built in the aftermath 
of the tornado by a group of Mennonites. We ate lunch every day at a second church, 
which fed all of the volunteers in the area. Many of the initial warehouses and 
shelters that we learned about had operated out of churches. There was a clear 
trend here – and I needed to understand why. 
 
 My introductory economics courses provided me the basic level of 
knowledge I needed to start examining my question: Disasters created a public 
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goods problem – that is, the public good of disaster relief was being underprovided. 
Churches – and religious organizations in general – were stepping in to provide the 
necessary services. It made inherent sense to me – religious organizations were 
based in faith, and that provided non-market encouragement to provide relief. 
 
Travelling to Moore, Oklahoma on a second JDRC Alternative Spring Break in 
March of 2014, I started to realize that it was more than just the moral impetus of 
faith that spurred churches to become major actors in disaster relief. In Oklahoma I 
started to ask questions and quickly found answers. Why did this church get 
involved? They had a large gym to use as storage for vital supplies. Why did the 
Methodists take charge of case management? Their church offered disaster 
response training and had a system of volunteers in place. I began to find that 
pastors found it easier than many others to put aside their duties for a few days, or 
to take on an extra workload for a month or so. I began to find that physical spaces 
were almost as big of a motivating factor as the teachings of the faith groups they 
housed. And I found that there were yet bigger questions to be answered. 
 
Thus, this Capstone project began. I started reading all I could. I started 
bouncing ideas off of anyone who would listen. I met with local chaplains here at SU, 
and reached out to my limited contacts, who at the time were more or less just the 
two full-time employees of the JDRC. It seemed like I had only ever met people with 
emotional attachments to these disasters – not the people who made the practical 
decisions to help the recovery effort. Fortunately, I applied for and received a Crown 
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Award through the Reneé Crown Honors Program, which allowed me to travel back 
to Joplin and Moore in January 2015 to meet some incredible people over five days 
of research. 
 
These five days – over two dozen hours of interviews – provided me the 
research boost I needed to bring this project to where it is today. Over the last 
semester, with the help of an incredible advisor and the honors staff, I took two 
years of curiosity and attempted to turn it into seventy or so pages of information 
and exploration. I hope that this paper can help those communities working right 
now to recover from a disaster, and all those who may face such tragedy in the 
future. 
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Premise 
 
 
Natural disasters make the news frequently; information on how to help is 
publicized as quickly as possible. Millions upon millions of dollars are raised 
overnight to help the damaged area of the country or the world. As climate change 
causes disasters to become more frequent and more destructive, what will happen 
to the disaster sites that can’t make the news? What will happen to the towns and 
cities where large, national voluntary organizations or federal agencies cannot 
provide the same level of aid that they do now? Who will step in to fill the void? 
 
This paper presents a suggested solution to this problem: Local, faith-based 
organizations. The following chapters will examine the causes of disasters and the 
systems that work to prevent and respond to them; climate change and its effects on 
natural disasters; faith-based organizations, and their roles in disaster relief. 
Further, it will examine an economic model and a series of case studies to present 
best practices and suggestions for responding to disaster when disaster relief 
fatigue has set in. This model and these case studies are not meant to be 
proscriptive; rather, they aim to provide insight into the mechanism of the 
rebuilding phase, and to provide an example of one structure for providing disaster 
relief services.
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Section 1: Natural Disasters and Disaster Relief 
 
Natural Disasters: Definitions and Dynamics 
Natural Hazards 
Natural hazards1 are defined by the World Meteorological Association 
(WMO) as “severe and extreme weather and climate events that occur naturally in 
all parts of the world” (WMO, n.d.). Natural hazards include drought, tropical 
cyclones, floods, landslides and mudslides, blizzards, avalanches, sandstorms, 
thermal extremes (heat waves and cold snaps), thunderstorms, lightning, tornadoes, 
forest fires, severe storms, volcanic eruptions, and more. More generally, natural 
hazards occur from the “ongoing geological processes of our planet” and often have 
“sudden onset” (Kieffer, 2013, p. xiv).  Natural hazards cause “immediate and major 
change on the surface of the earth” as a result of dynamic changes within the earth, 
or in its atmosphere (p. 8) By most definitions, a natural hazard can occur with or 
without interaction with human society. A natural hazard, such as a hurricane (a 
form of tropical cyclone), can form over the Atlantic Ocean and never make contact 
1 Others would use the term “natural phenomena” in this place; for the purpose of 
this piece, the term “hazard” will represent a natural event outside of its interaction 
with human populations. In particular, the Organization of American States uses this 
terminology, with the term “natural disaster” being reserved for situations of 
“unacceptably large” levels of destruction or fatalities (OAS, 1990). 
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with land or cause any harm to human property. Once it does “touch ground” and 
affect humanity – be it through destruction of human life or property – a natural 
hazard is considered to be a natural disaster.  
 
Natural Disasters 
When natural hazards intersect with human society, natural disasters occur. 
Like a tree falling in a forest, if a tornado happens in an uninhabited area it is not a 
disaster but just a hazard, or perhaps just weather, much as the tree makes no 
sound.2 From a geologic perspective, “disasters occur when accumulated energy is 
suddenly released in a way that harms humans” (Kieffer, 2013, p. 23). By its most 
basic definition, a natural or hazard or weather event only becomes a disaster when 
it “results in significant harm to lives and/or property, as well as disruption to 
normal patterns of living” (NYDIS, 2014a). 
 
Dynamics of Disasters 
Natural disasters are caused by changes in the dynamics of the Earth’s crust, 
plates, atmosphere and bodies of water. They can be broken down into three broad 
categories (Evans, 2011). 
1. Ones caused by the movement of the Earth 
2. Weather-related disasters 
2 Sound is a perceived quality; the vibrations from the tree would go unperceived 
and therefore no sound would be made. 
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3. Secondary or Supplementary disasters 
 
The first type of disaster is those caused by the movement of the earth, and 
are otherwise known as geological disasters. This category includes earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis. These disasters, resulting from the unpredictable 
movements of the Earth’s tectonic plates, tend to come without warning and 
generate some of the most devastating results. Generally, all that can be done to 
ameliorate the effects of these types of disasters is to prepare ahead of time and 
build resilience as a community, especially through building and structural codes. 
 
The second type of disaster, which is associated with weather, includes 
tornadoes, hurricanes, other storms, and extreme temperature events. While still 
highly unpredictable, there is usually significantly more warning with these types of 
disasters. The amount of warning time can vary – hurricanes and tropical storms 
tend to move slowly, giving a few days warning in some cases and allowing for 
evacuation. Tornadoes fall at the other end of the spectrum, as they develop quickly 
and their paths can be highly unpredictable. While warning systems are in place, the 
national average for warning time is just 13 minutes, enough usually just to get to a 
shelter or a safer space (Heberton, 2014). Much like tectonic disasters, preparation 
is the most important way to reduce damage. 
 
Secondary or supplementary disasters come along with or are the result of 
other disasters. Flooding, for example, might come along with a hurricane, or result 
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afterward due to damage caused to natural or human systems, best exemplified by 
the breaking of the levies in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Penuel and 
Statler, 2011, p. 323). In this case, the majority of the damage came not from the 
hurricane itself but the resulting floods that left almost 80% of the city underwater 
(Shughart, 2011, p. 522). 
 
Disaster Damages 
In all of the above cases, disasters occur quickly and leave devastating, 
lasting results that require immense collective effort to repair. Damage occurs to 
both personal and public property, and in addition there may be deaths and injuries.  
In the United States alone, natural disasters have caused almost 3000 fatalities, and 
upwards of $92 billion in damage in 2009-2013 (NWS). Natural disasters tend to 
disproportionately affect minorities and other groups who tend to be of lower 
socioeconomic status (PBS).  
 
Even those with full home insurance will often find that reconstruction after 
a disaster may cost more than they can provide. Oftentimes insurance will not cover 
the costs of staying in a hotel, needing to miss work or change jobs. In a fairly 
specific example, in Moore, OK, many families with full insurance could not move 
back into their homes because local ordinance required a fence and tree on a 
residential property in order for it to be fit for habitation; homeowners insurance 
often didn’t cover this (M. Bewely and C. Fox, Personal Communication, January 9th, 
2015). Frequently, things such as sheds and patios are also not covered.  In response 
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to the significant economic need created by disasters, an entire sector of the 
economy has developed to provide assistance to those in need after they hit
 
Disaster Relief 
 After a disaster strikes, the damage it causes needs to be addressed. The 
following section examines the processes by which society responds to and recovers 
from natural disasters. 
 
History of Disaster Relief 
 For almost as long as there has been government and a public sector, there 
has been disaster relief. One of the earliest specific accounts of disaster relief comes 
from perhaps the most famous volcanic disaster of all time – the 79 AD eruption of 
Mt. Vesuvius. Pliny the Younger’s firsthand account gives us a glimpse into ancient 
views of disaster relief. Pliny the Elder set out to rescue trapped villagers and 
perished along the way. At his behest, the Roman government helped with recovery 
and rebuilding efforts with a lowering of taxes and provision of financial aid, a 
precedent that had been set by Caesar himself (Hughes, 2012, p. 72-73). 
  
The modern era of disaster relief is often said to have begun in 1863. That 
year, Henry Dunant founded the committee that, in 1919, eventually became the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Since then, it has 
become one of the largest disaster relief organizations in the world, with 186 
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national societies (Penuel and Statler, 2011, p. xxix-xxx). From that point, a number 
of more formalized disaster relief organizations and societies formed, including 
USAID, the British Disasters Emergency Committee, a number of UN-based 
organizations, and hundreds of national and local groups (p. xxx-xxxii).  
 
Disaster Relief in the United States 
History of Federal Disaster Relief  
In the United States, disaster relief remained a fairly localized and 
decentralized process until the later part of the twentieth century. Government-
sponsored disaster relief efforts are generally considered to begin with the 
Congressional Act of 1803, which provided aid to the town of Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire after it was ravaged by fire (PBS, n.d.; Penuel and Statler, 2011 p. 731, 
FEMA 2008). For more than a century, this was the extent of government 
involvement – individual dispensations by over one hundred individual pieces of 
legislation on a case-by-case basis (FEMA, 2015). 
 
Through a series of acts in response to the effects of the Great Depression in 
the early 1930s, federal disaster relief became more centralized and procedural. The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), formed by President Hoover, was given 
the charge of dispensing funds in response to disasters (Penuel and Statler, 2011 p. 
731). Similarly, in 1934 the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to rebuild 
federal roads post-disaster, and through the 1965 Flood Control Act, the Army Corps 
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of Engineers was given flood control and response responsibilities. (FEMA, 2015). 
Eventually, most of these tasks were further centralized under the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration, overseen by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. 
 
The system of federalized disaster relief that we see today was implemented 
by the Carter administration, through the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which 
established the process of Presidential disaster declarations, and Executive Order 
12127, which took the more than 100 federal agencies with disaster relief 
responsibilities and centralized them under the new Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA, 2015). In 1988, the Stafford Act gave statutory 
authority to the agency, amending the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 to coordinate 
Presidential declarations with FEMA’s disaster relief activities (ibid).  
 
In 2003, FEMA was incorporated into the newly formed Department of 
Homeland Security, with most of its functions merged into the larger department. 
However, after the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina in 2004, FEMA was 
reorganized as a unique, mostly independent entity under DHS. It is in this form that 
FEMA exists today; functioning more or less like it did pre-2003 (Penuel and Statler, 
2011, p. 202; FEMA 2015).  
 
 23 
History of Voluntary Disaster Relief 
Disaster relief in the United States also involves a large array of local, state, 
and national entities including local governments and non-profit organizations that 
work side-by side with FEMA in local communities, joined by communal 
organizations in their efforts.  
 
The beginning of the history of volunteer organizations in disaster relief in 
the United States can perhaps be most specifically pinpointed in 1881, when Clara 
Barton spearheaded the formation of the American Red Cross, which was 
legitimized by the American signing of the Geneva Convention in 1882 and by the 
granting of a congressional charter in 1900 (Red Cross, n.d.; Texas Impact, 2006). 
One of the first disasters the newly formed American Red Cross responded to was 
the 1889 flood in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.  The Red Cross acted in tandem with the 
local relief efforts, under the coordination of the federal government (Penuel and 
Statler, 2011 p. 291).  
 
From that point on, the Red Cross and other groups were heavily involved in 
all major disasters in the US. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake saw an 
overwhelming response, with the Red Cross and other groups, including some 
spontaneously formed citizen groups setting up soup kitchens and temporary 
shelters around the area, providing unnecessary overlap of services (ibid). From 
this point, the rise of more structured, established organizations began as part of the 
creation of a national response network. 
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After Hurricane Camille decimated the Gulf Coast in 1969, a number of 
problems with the existing disaster relief system in the US were revealed, perhaps 
most significantly that minorities were being treated unfairly by voluntary 
organizations (Texas Impact, 2006). As a response, in 1970 the Red Cross and six 
other organizations came together to form the National Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disaster (NVOAD) to better coordinate relief efforts in an attempt to curb 
duplication and standardize service provision for all (ibid; Penuel and Statler, 2011, 
p. 293).  It is under this NVOAD-centered system that disaster relief in the private 
and voluntary sector operates today. 
 
The Disaster Relief System 
 The remainder of this paper will focus specifically on responses to natural 
disasters domestically in the United States. The following section seeks to explain 
and describe the systems used and processes followed after a major disaster occurs. 
 
Stages of Disaster Relief 
 In discussion of disaster relief, a standard vocabulary is needed to break 
down the various phases of the process. These phases or stages are part of the 
larger cycle of disaster relief3, presented here in a linear order. These phases are 
fluid and overlap; there is no set length of time for each stage, nor are there hard 
start and end points. For the purposes of this paper, however, the cycle of disaster 
3 Also referred to as the cycle of disaster management. 
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relief is broken down into four stages to be spoken of independently: Mitigation and 
Preparation; Response; Rebuilding; Recovery.  
 
Mitigation and Preparation 
 The stage of mitigation and preparation4 focuses on preparing for the next 
possible disaster. Mitigation is defined as “reducing or eliminating the future effects 
of a disaster,” through the creation of systems and infrastructure that is prepared to 
withstand or minimize damage (NYDIS, 2014a). This can be accomplished in a 
variety of ways, including risk-reduction projects like the construction of levies or 
improvements to key infrastructure and resource lifelines (FEMA, 2011, p. 81).  
 
 Preparedness refers more specifically to an area’s readiness for an 
impending disaster. This includes establishing who is responsible for what during 
an emergency, coordinating strategies for resource provision, and planning for 
further leadership structures (NYDIS, 2014a). Though most heavily focused on the 
in the immediate period before a disaster, preparation is not just a short-term goal; 
local and national governments and organizations work every day to prepare for 
disasters. 
 
4 Often, these are considered to be two different stages. For the purpose of 
understanding and discussing specific responses to disaster, they are herein 
effectively the same stage and will be presented as such. 
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Response 
 The response phase of disaster relief begins immediately when a disaster 
begins, and includes search and rescue efforts during and immediately after a 
disaster, as well as the provision of food, medicine, shelter, and other basic 
necessities in the moments and days just after a disaster (Penuel and Stateler, 2011, 
p. 97).  The main goals of the response phase include “saving lives, protecting 
property, and providing for public welfare” as it pertains to the damage of a disaster 
(NYDIS, 2014a). 
 
 The response phase is perhaps the most publicized stage of the disaster. It is 
at this point that the majority of donations are received; for most major disasters, 
television coverage is almost guaranteed, further supporting the funding of relief 
efforts as unaffected citizens tend to respond emotionally to destruction and loss of 
others (Penuel and Statler, 2011, p. 97). It is during the response phase that a 
declaration of disaster, whether local/mayoral, gubernatorial, or presidential, would 
be made. It is important to note that a declaration of disaster does not start the 
response phase; rather, it initiates the government-sponsored and coordinated 
aspects of disaster relief.  
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Rebuilding 
 The rebuilding stage of disaster relief is an intermediate but highly 
significant phase of the cycle5. In most cases, the rebuilding phase is a specific type 
of recovery, in which the focus on the return to normalcy of life is centered on 
physical rebuilding of homes, businesses, and other structures. Generally, this phase 
involves a number of unique actors, adding insurance companies, local contractors, 
and more specialized nonprofits on to the existing list of government and 
nongovernment entities already working on-site from the response phase. 
Rebuilding starts as the response phase winds down, and usually takes from 3-5 
years to complete. 
 
Recovery 
 Long-term recovery, herein referred to as simply as recovery, focuses on 
“helping communities heal and return to a state that is similar to, or even improved 
from, pre-disaster conditions” (NYDIS, 2014a). Major activities in this stage include 
restoration of infrastructure, restoring health, social and community services, and 
promoting economic development and re-development (FEMA, 2011, p. 81). 
Recovery is the longest and most fluid of the stages of the disaster relief cycle; by 
5 Depending on the source, this phase may be known as part of the recovery phase 
(Penuel and Statler, 2011, p. 98), “short-term recovery” (NYDIS, 2014a) or “long-
term recovery” (FEMA 2011). Others would refer to this phase as “reconstruction” 
(Disaster Definitions, 2008, p. 29). 
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many views, recovery starts the moment a disaster hits and ends only at the next 
disaster; for the purposes of discussion, this and other papers frame recovery as 
generalized recovery of society after immediate response and through the period 
where the economy and community has reached a stable level of normalcy or near-
normalcy, as defined by the local community itself.  
 
The National Disaster Recovery Framework lays out four possible conditions 
for a “successful” or “completed” recovery phase. The community: 
• Successfully overcomes the physical, emotional, and environmental 
impacts of the disaster; 
• Reestablishes an economic and social base that instills confidence in 
the community members and businesses regarding community 
viability; 
• Rebuilds by integrating the functional needs of all residents and 
reducing its vulnerability to all hazards facing it. 
• Demonstrates a capability to be prepared, responsive, and resilient in 
dealing with the consequences of disasters (FEMA, 2011, p. 13). 
 
Major Players in Disaster Relief 
Although every disaster presents different challenges and requires different 
solutions, there are a number of constants, especially in regards to the various major 
players involved in the relief cycle. Who exactly is involved depends on the scale and 
scope of the disaster, but in a major natural disaster – one with a Presidential 
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declaration of disaster – it is likely to see all if not most of these major players. 
Described below are the major categories of actors in disaster relief situation, with a 
discussion of their roles, as well as further information about specific actors in each 
category. 
 
State and Local Government 
 At the onset of a disaster, the most immediate response begins with the local 
government. Before any local government resources can be mobilized, there must 
be a declaration of disaster from the mayor or a similarly empowered local official. 
After this point, any organizations assigned responsibility as part of a local disaster 
management plan are activated6 and begin to implement their assigned tasks, which 
begin with those of the response phase – search and rescue, provision of basic 
human needs, and eventually the restoration of basic services and utilities. After 
activating any necessary actors, the local government may serve as a coordinating 
body. Often, other groups will step in to fill coordination and leadership roles, while 
the local government will “step back” to facilitate the actions of those who are often 
better suited to certain tasks. 
6 Activation is a sector-standard term used to refer to the process by which an 
organization or entity becomes involved in any stage of the disaster relief cycle. For 
almost all governmental agencies, activation requires a declaration of disaster at the 
proper level of government. Many non-profits and NGOs sign Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs) with government or other non-government entities to 
determine their conditions of activation. Still other groups may self-activate; this 
tends to pose challenges in coordination that will be discussed later. 
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 The local government plays a large role in the recovery phase, as the 
restoration of a degree of normalcy often involves the passing, changing, or 
suspension of certain laws or regulations, temporarily or permanently. It is not 
unusual that during this phase, the local government works create a recovery 
scenario that allows for more effective mitigation and preparation. 
 
 On the state level, things look more or less the same. Depending on the scale 
and scope of a disaster, a state government may need a request from local 
authorities to step in, or a governor may make an executive declaration of disaster 
on his or her own based on specific, predetermined criteria7. In regards to 
functioning during the stages of disaster relief, the state government works 
similarly to a local government, with roles varying situationally.  
 
All states have a State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) that functions 
in a highly similar manner to FEMA, whose function is described below: 
  
FEMA and the Federal Government 
 The federal government tends to take a more hands-off approach to disaster 
relief than state or local governments. In order for the Federal government to 
7 In most cases, a spontaneous gubernatorial declaration of disaster requires a 
multi-locality disaster of a significant level of damage.  
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become involved in the disaster relief cycle, a Presidential declaration of disaster 
must be requested by the local or state government; only once one is issued will 
FEMA or other federal entities activate in response to the disaster. 
 
 FEMA’s role in disaster relief is outlines by their mission statement: 
 
“FEMA’s Mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect 
communities nationwide from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, and other man-made disasters. FEMA leads and supports the nation in a 
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery and mitigation” (FEMA, 2008). 
 
 FEMA works to achieve its mission through six specific goals: (Koenig, 2006): 
1. “Prepare” – Working with states and localities to figure out how to 
handle a breakdown of essential services, reviewing States’ 
Emergency Operations Plans, and providing various training 
opportunities for elected officials and professionals. 
2. “Respond” – Once a federal declaration is issued, FEMA works with 
local authorities to get emergency equipment and teams where 
they are needed; provides food, water, shelter, and medical 
services; and works with local authorities to quickly restore 
essential services and utilities. 
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3. “Recover” – Focusing mostly on the “Rebuild” stage, FEMA 
provides loans and grants to help rebuild homes, business, and 
infrastructure. 
4. “Mitigate” – FEMA works with local authorities in their mitigation 
planning, and provides grants and loans to fund mitigation 
projects. 
5. “Risk Reduction” – works with the Federal Insurance 
Administration to provide affordable insurance to American 
citizens. 
6. “Prevention” – FEMA works with local entities to set building 
codes and other regulations to become more resilient to natural 
disasters. 
 
When not directly responding to a disaster, FEMA works with state and local 
agencies on its Prepare, Mitigate, Risk Reduction, and Prevention goals. After a 
declaration of disaster is made, FEMA establishes a Disaster Field Office, led by a 
Federal Coordinating Officer and the State Response Team. Using any and all pre-
prepared plans, the Field Office works to provide the services necessary to 
accomplish its “Respond” and “Recover” goals. This often includes the mobilization 
of emergency response and search and rescue teams, and the evaluation of damage 
in order to provide proper funding through grants and loans. 
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Non-Profit Organizations 
 Government at any level does not and cannot provide every service and 
resource necessary for disaster relief. In these cases, “nonprofits directly 
supplement and fill gaps where government authority and resources cannot be 
applied” (FEMA, 2011, p.21). Non-profit organizations8 take a number of forms and 
provide a wide variety of services.  
  
Nonprofit organizations can range in size from large, national or multi-
national  groups like the American Red Cross, which is itself an affiliate of the 
international Red Cross/Red Crescent network and provides a wide array of 
services, to smaller, more niche groups like NECHAMA: Jewish Response to Disaster, 
which is a smaller American-Jewish organization that focuses on providing tools and 
assistance to those rebuilding their homes in local communities after a disaster. No 
matter the scale or scope of the organization, nonprofits are unified by their 
dependence on volunteers and charitable donations, which create unique challenges 
and opportunities as compared to other major actors that make them an important 
part of the disaster relief sector. 
 
8 Though usually considered to be a specific subset of “non-governmental” 
organizations, for the purposes of this paper, the two terms will be considered 
synonymous.  
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Section 2: Climate Change and Natural Disasters 
 
Introduction 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report, 
completed in November 2014, states that human influence on the climate system is 
clear and that increased disruption to our climate will increase risk of severe, 
pervasive impacts (IPCC Press Office, 2015).  Warming of our climate system is 
“unequivocal,” and its observed effects are persistent: warming of the ocean and 
atmosphere, decreased global snow and ice, sea level rise, and increased 
concentration of greenhouse gases (Alexander et. Al., 2013, p. 4). The sections below 
seek to give a brief overview of relevant expected and current effects of climate 
change. 
 
Effects of Climate Change 
Global Temperatures 
 One of the core aspects of climate change is global warming, or the increased 
average temperature of the Earth, relative to historical average. At current rates of 
greenhouse gas emissions combined with other contributing global factors, global 
surface temperatures are expected to increase by at least, 1.5 C from 1850-1900 
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mean temperatures, with some models projecting at least 2 C or more above these 
levels (Alexander et Al., 2013, p. 20).  
 
Such a rise in global average temperatures mean a “virtually certain” 
increase in extreme high and extreme low temperatures, accompanied by a “very 
likely” increased occurrence of heat waves and other extreme temperature events 
(ibid).  Heat waves, cold snaps, and other extreme weather events often become 
disasters in their own right 
 
Sea Level and Ice 
 Since 1950, there has been significant retreating of glaciers and retreating of 
sea ice, resulting in sea level rise. It is “very likely” that sea ice, glaciers, and spring 
snow levels will all decrease during the 21st century as a result of increased global 
temperatures (p.  24). Thermal expansion and glacial melting account for the 
majority of the expected increase in sea level, which is expected to increase at a 
growing rate over the next century (p. 25). Higher sea level leads to larger storm 
surges and increased flooding in conjunction with hurricanes and other disasters. 
 
Atmosphere and Weather 
 Average global precipitation is expected to increase during the 21st century. 
It is “very likely” that extreme precipitation events will increase in frequency and 
 36 
intensity over the course of this century. El Nino-Southern Oscillation and Monsoon 
effects are expected to increase in area and intensity as well. (p. 23).  
  
Climate Change and Natural Disasters 
 It is nearly certain that climate change will continue on for at least the next 
century. Even if global emissions were cut to zero right now, we would continue to 
experience the effects of climate change for a prolonged period. These effects, 
current and expected, are already having and will continue to have a profound effect 
on natural systems around the world, subsequently affecting natural hazards and 
disasters, as well as affecting societies’ ability to respond to these disasters. 
 
Impact on Risk, Vulnerability and Exposure 
 A number of climate change induced factors are increasing the risk of natural 
disasters. According to the IPCC, risk from climate change stems from vulnerability 
(lack of preparedness) and exposure (being in harms way) overlapping with natural 
hazards (IPCC Press Office, 2014, p. 1).  With “very high confidence,” climate 
scientists have identified “significant vulnerability and exposure” of many humans 
to the increasing effects of climate change (Field et Al, 2014, p. 7) 
 
 In assessing risk, the IPCC WGII has identified five reasons for concern 
(RFCs). Three of them apply very specifically to natural disasters: RFC 2 addresses 
increased risk from extreme events, including extreme temperatures and 
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precipitation, which can quickly become natural disasters. RFC 3 raises concerns 
about uneven distribution of impacts, noting that risks are unevenly weighted 
towards disadvantaged people in particular. RFC 5 notes that large-scale singular 
events, like the melting of the Greenland ice sheets, could exacerbate current 
situations quickly and intensely (p. 13). 
 
 As explained above, increasing magnitudes of global warming have increased 
the probability of “severe and pervasive impacts” to human society (IPCC Press 
Office, 2014, p. 2)).  Increased extreme weather events, combined with increasing 
areas of vulnerability are expected to increase both the frequency and intensity of 
natural disasters.  
 
 Take for example costal or low-lying areas. As sea levels rise, these areas are 
already facing the threat of flooding and submergence; as the frequency and 
intensity of hurricanes and tropical storms increases as well, these factors are 
expected to combine to create exponentially larger destruction. Similar exposure-
vulnerability combinations exist for various other regions. 
  
Impact on Disaster Relief 
 The most important impact of climate change on disaster relief will come 
from the increase in frequency and intensity of natural disasters. A number of other 
challenges caused subsequently or concurrently, will also emerge. Climate change 
and natural disasters both already disproportionately affect the disadvantaged; the 
 38 
effects of climate change will create more and more-disadvantaged populations, 
requiring even more relief services after a disaster hits (Field et al, 2014, p. 21).  
  
 From a relief provision standpoint, one of the most significant effects of 
climate change will be “disaster relief fatigue,” the idea that as disasters become 
more frequent and more destructive, societies’ ability to respond will become 
strained. More destructive and more frequent disasters will require more resources; 
simultaneously, increased frequency will decrease the availability of those much-
needed resources.  
 
 Disaster relief fatigue will present itself in a variety of ways, from funding 
and volunteer shortages, to overextension of government and nonprofit groups. 
Coordination will become increasingly difficult, both due to overextension and 
increased destruction in each disaster area. In order to ameliorate the effects of 
these various factors, new methods and strategies for disaster relief must be 
implemented. In the remainder of this paper, I present the case for an increased role 
of local, faith-based organizations in disaster relief operations in order to combat 
climate change-induced disaster relief fatigue. 
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Section Three: The Case for Faith 
 
Introduction 
In disaster relief, Faith-Based Organizations have played a major role for 
decades. Quakers, Mennonites, and the Salvation Army have each been running 
disaster relief operations for over 50 years, and every major religious denomination 
in the United States has had some active part in disaster relief in the past 30 years 
(Koenig, 2006,). Almost 75% of NVOAD’s membership is Faith-Based, and each 
organization tends to specialize in 1-3 aspects of relief, almost exclusively during 
the response and rebuilding stages. Many of these specific roles will be discussed 
throughout this paper, particularly in Section 5.  
 
Faith-Based Organizations: An Overview 
 Even with globally declining church attendance and affiliation with faith, 
Faith-based organizations continue to play a major, and often growing, role in 
society. Faith-based organizations run many of the social-service nonprofits that 
keep our urban populations from being forgotten; they sponsor education from pre-
school through graduate study9; and they provide critical relief efforts after 
9 In fact, almost every institute of higher learning in the United States founded 
before 1900 was related in some way to a faith-based group. 
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disasters. Despite their prevalence in society, they are not always visible, well 
known, or understood. 
 
Definitions and Categories of Faith-Based Organizations 
 Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are a significant subset of nonprofit 
organizations. Churches and similar houses of worship (“Institutions of Faith”) are 
not considered to be FBOs by definition; however, they can, and do, act as FBOs in 
their mission work and engagement with the community and world at large. 
Generally, FBOs are divided into five broad categories (Clarke, 2006): 
 
1. Faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies – these FBOs 
handle doctrine and govern the adherents of their religion; they serve 
as representatives to other organizations and governments on behalf 
of their populations. Examples in this category include the 
Vatican/Holy See, the World Muslim League, or Baptist General 
Convention. 
 
2. Faith-Based Charitable or Development Organizations – these FBOs 
provide social services, work towards international development, and 
collect and coordinate donations for charitable causes. These 
organizations run the gamut of size and scope – anything from a local 
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church soup kitchen to the Salvation Army falls into this category. 
 
3. Faith-Based Socio-political Organizations – these FBOs deploy faith as 
a motivator for social and political change. Organizations in this 
category would mostly include faith-based political parties, and some 
advocacy and lobbying groups. 
 
4. Faith-Based Missionary Organizations – these FBOs serve to spread 
their respective faiths through engaging with other communities and 
seeking converts. These may be stand-alone agencies, like the African 
Muslim Agency, or may be arms of Faith-Based Representative 
organizations, like the highly structured missionary arm of the Latter 
Day Saints movement. 
 
5. Faith-Based Illegal or Terrorist Organizations – these FBOs engage in 
illegal activity or armed conflict in the name of faith. Terrorist groups 
like Al-Qaida or Boko Haram make up this category. 
 
It is important to note that it is possible, much like an Institution of Faith can 
act as any of the five types of Faith-Based Organizations, any FBO, regardless of its 
primary categorization, may act at times or through specific arms as any other type 
of FBO.   
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The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Disaster Relief 
Faith-Based Charitable Organizations 
 When it comes to Faith-Based Organizations in disaster relief, the work is 
done by groups in the category of Faith-Based Charitable Organizations, or by other 
FBOs (usually Representative Organizations, but sometimes Missionary 
Organizations) and Institutions of Faith acting as Faith-Based Charitable 
Organizations, whether through temporary conversion of their goals and missions, 
or through existing, spontaneous, or re-purposed outreach arms of their 
organizations.  
 
 When not responding to a disaster, many of these FBOs already provide 
critical social services. Many local congregations host or house food pantries, 
homeless shelters, or soup kitchens. Catholic Charities manages a number of 
charitable programs, including refugee resettlement; the Salvation Army famously 
runs its warehouses and thrift shops; and local and national groups alike do 
community service and fundraising in the name of the needy. 
 
 It is important to denote at this time four major subtypes of Faith-Based 
Charitable Organizations, and how they will be referred to subsequently:  
 
1. “Disaster Relief FBOs” or “Faith-Based Disaster Organizations” – charitable, 
nonprofit organizations of any faith that specialize in disaster relief as their 
main form of engagement; used to refer to organizations that operate on a 
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national scale. 
 
2. “Charitable FBOs” or “Faith-Based Charitable Organizations” – charitable, 
nonprofit organizations of any faith that specialize in service provision other 
than disaster relief, but are acting as part of the disaster relief process; used 
to refer to organizations that operate on a national scale. 
 
3. “Local congregations,” “houses of worship,” or more generally “churches” – 
charitable, nonprofit organizations of any faith that mainly serve as places of 
worship and religious function, that may or may not act as part of the 
disaster relief process. 
 
4. “Local FBOs” – charitable, nonprofit organizations of any faith of a local or 
regional scale that provide social services or other charitable activities on a 
reduced, local scale. 
 
The Case for Faith-Based Organizations as a Solution for Disaster Relief 
Fatigue 
The Impact of Faith 
 Faith-Based Organizations present a number of unique advantages that allow 
them to excel in charitable works, and specifically in disaster relief. A Red Cross poll 
after 9/11 found that over 60% of respondents would seek help from a spiritual 
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caregiver in a disaster situation, as compared to 45% who would seek out a 
physician, or 40% who would seek out a mental health professional (Koenig, 2006, 
p. 22). Similar polls have shown again and again that a majority of Americans turn to 
religious leaders for “comfort, guidance, and wisdom” (NYDIS, 2014). This plays a 
major role in the service provision aspect of disaster relief, as local congregations 
tend to become ideal organizations for service providers to connect with those in 
need. 
 
 From a moral or cultural standpoint, it makes sense that Faith-Based 
Organizations would succeed in charitable circumstances. Nearly every major 
religious tradition has texts and beliefs that support, encourage, or even require 
charity. Judaism teaches tikkun olam – “healing the world;” Christ preached 
compassion and aid for the downtrodden; one of the five pillars of Islam is charity. 
Though many of these teachings have evolved into societal mores of a secular 
variety, Faith-Based Organizations continue to play a central role in influencing 
charitable behavior. 
 
 Disaster expert Francis Gunn provides a list of reasons as to why Faith-Based 
Organizations are so prominent and successful in disaster relief service provision. In 
many communities, these organizations, local or national, serve as the primary 
means of spiritual and social support for community members. From an emotional 
standpoint, faith-based organizations are representative of “divine intervention” to 
many victims, and are signs of “power, protection, and healing.” As institutions, 
 45 
faith-based organizations emanate stability, something that disaster victims are 
drawn to in their times of turmoil, and their messages are structured in such a way 
that they become easily accessible to victims (Koenig, 2006, p. 15). 
 
 Faith communities, as extensions of faith-based organizations, also provide 
many advantages to the work of FBOs. There is a tradition of FBOs coming to aid the 
needy; their actions tells victims “you are not alone in this.” Meanwhile, from a 
practical standpoint, faith communities have networks to help move and provide 
resources and services, and are significantly more likely to stick around after other 
nonprofits and emergency services providers leave (Koenig, 2006).  
 
 Faith-Based Organizations are also important providers of spiritual and 
emotional care during disasters. NVOAD’s emotional and spiritual care committee 
has a set of points of agreement on provision of spiritual care; spiritual care 
providers work closely with medical and mental health professionals to provide 
well rounded, comprehensive care from the moment a disaster strikes through the 
recovery period. Many national charitable FBOs, as well as representative 
organizations, offer training for clergy to serve as spiritual care providers in disaster 
situations. Interfaith groups like NYDIS also provide more generic versions of the 
same trainings, often working to make sure that spiritual care providers do not 
cause unwanted or uncomfortable circumstances while providing care. 
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Local Congregations 
From a more practical standpoint, FBOs tend to provide easily accessible 
opportunities to do good. Studies have shown that frequency of attendance at 
religious services correlated positively with emergency assistance – independent of 
age, income, and congregational friendships (Koenig, 2006, p. 12).  The study 
concluded that in addition to religious motivation for doing these charitable 
activities, religious bodies were particularly influential by providing concrete 
opportunities for their members to help disaster victims.  
 
The structure of local congregations provides important advantages to their 
provision of disaster relief as well. Local congregations tend to be centered in a 
church or other physical structure – in many southern and midwestern cities, but in 
major costal urban areas as well, these are large, if not the largest structures in the 
area – that for most of the week goes unused or severely underutilized. These 
structures therefore frequently serve as warehouses, soup kitchens, food pantries, 
temporary shelter for victims and volunteers, or meeting places for volunteers and 
organizers. Many of these local congregations tend to have pre-existing 
infrastructure (i.e. buildings with bunks or kitchens) that allow them to readily 
begin providing services at a moments notice. 
 
The advantages of local congregations extend to the staff as well. Most of the 
staff – clergy or lay – at local congregations does not have specific, day-to-day tasks 
as would, say, an accountant. This means that in times of disaster, many of these 
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local leaders can transfer some or all of their efforts to disaster relief more easily 
than people in most other professions. This is important, because it allows those 
leaders to run operations out of their already pre-advantaged locations, or to go out 
into the community to provide other services. For example, after the West Virginia 
Floods of 1972, many ministers found themselves very involved in relief work even 
sixteen months after the floods had receded (Koening, 2006). 
 
The Case for Faith 
It is clear that Faith-Based Charitable Organizations, in their many shapes 
and sizes, provide innumerable and immensely important services during times of 
disaster. National organizations have access to deep coffers and willing donors; local 
congregations have the resources – space, infrastructure, and labor – that are 
necessary to provide key services quickly and effectively. As the following section 
will show, the local approach to disaster relief allows for optimal deployment of 
resources; faith-based management of these resources will be shown to be the most 
efficient at this maximization for those reasons. 
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Section 4: An Economic Model of Local Disaster Relief 
Choice-Making Optimization 
 
Introduction 
 This section presents a working economic model of disaster relief provision 
in order to uncover and explore the driving costs and organizational and 
coordination needs of providing disaster relief in a local setting. 
 
The Local Perspective 
 If you speak to anyone with a background in disaster relief, they’ll all give 
you the same mantra: All disasters start locally, and end locally. Whether it is a small 
local fire or a major, multi-state tornado with a Presidential declaration of disaster 
and billions of dollars in aid, the work that happens occurs locally. National 
organizations have to adapt to local terrain, while local organizations have to learn 
to provide disaster relief services, but it all happens on the local stage. Thus, this 
model will examine service provision and resource allocation on a local scale. 
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The Model 
Assumptions Made 
 For the purposes of this model, all disaster relief will occur in one contained 
locality. Regardless of the source, all funds, tools, etc. can be used by or provided to 
any provider as best optimizes their use. 
 
The Big Picture 
 Disaster relief can be, at its most basic form, be broken down as to be 
composed of four major “stocks” – Capital Stock of Public Infrastructure, Capital 
Stock of Private Homes and Business, Consumption to meet basic human needs, and 
spiritual wellbeing. This model seeks to explore the resource allocation and 
prioritization processes that govern the replenishing of the capital stock of private 
homes and businesses. 
 
The Capital Stock of Private Homes and Businesses 
 While investment in public infrastructure is simply funded through public 
money, investment in the capital stock of public infrastructure is composed of 
private funds, which include personal savings, insurance claims, and FEMA grants, 
and charitable funds, which are intended to cover the gaps in what private funds can 
afford. As private investment is directed by the entity it belongs to, it is these 
charitable donations that pose the coordination problem that is at the center of 
disaster relief activity.  
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 Zooming in on disaster relief provision, the provision of 𝐾𝐾𝐻𝐻, the Capital Stock 
of Private Homes and Businesses, can be viewed as an incremental, period-based 
function. Each period 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 to 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1 is of equal length, each with its own individual, 
limited amount of resources to make some amount of investment 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  to increase the 
capital stock. 
 
Figure 1 - Capital Stock of Private Homes and Businesses 
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In each period there are, therefore, coordinating, budgeting, and prioritizing 
decisions that need to be made. The question is, then, how and by what means to 
make these decisions. 
 
The Investment/Production Model 
 Consider a tornado that has spiraled its way through a small midwestern 
town. In its wake one would find private homes and businesses in various states of 
disrepair. In this case, the capital stock 𝐾𝐾𝐻𝐻 is made up of stock levels of Highly 
Damaged (H), Moderately Damaged (M), Superficially Damaged (S), and Undamaged 
(U) buildings, such that a home categorized as H can be repaired to level U only by 
first being repaired to level M and then P, as illustrated below: 
 
 
Figure 2 - Private Home Rebuilding Investment Sequence 
 
In this case, in order to repair one home from highly damaged to a 
moderately damaged level, one must start with a highly damaged home, and will 
require five skilled laborers and ten units of materials to complete.  These 
investments produce a building of improved status by the following Leontief (Fixed-
proportion) production functions: 
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Equation 3 and 4 
 
 Where 𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇 , 𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ,𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡  are the number of buildings of the indicated 
level of damage at time t; 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡  is skilled, trained labor; 𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡  is “unskilled” or 
“untrained” labor that has no specific training in construction or disaster relief; 𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 
is the capital stock of tools, measured in number of tools; and 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the amount of 
consumable supplies needed to complete the required repairs. Each of these 
production functions can be assumed to take the same amount of time to complete. 
  
There exist two functions for 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡  because the repair actions are simple 
construction processes, and could be done quickly and at low resource cost by two 
skilled laborers (Equation 4), or more slowly and inefficiently by a larger group of 
unskilled laborers (Equation 3). In reality, skilled laborers are either unavailable or 
assigned to functions that require them without alternatives, so Equation 3 
represents almost every case. 
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There also exists a stock level of each type of home,  
𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 
Equation 5 
𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 −  𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1  
Equation 6 
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 =  𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1 
Equation 7 
𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1  
Equation 8 
Where the stock level N of a of a specific number of a homes at a certain level 
of damage at a point, t, is equal to the number of homes at that level before the 
previous round of investment, plus the number of homes invested in and rebuilt to 
the current level, minus any homes that were repaired to a lower level of damage in 
the same period. 
 
A Small-Scale Example 
 In the case of this midwestern tornado, we can predict that some amount of 
each of the above resources flows into the area in varying amounts. The question 
then becomes how to maximize production by the distribution of these resources.  
 
With the above information in mind, there are a few basic strategies that 
might be employed. One might attempt to take as many homes as possible from High 
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damage to Undamaged. This would mean performing each repair (production 
function) sequentially on one home at a time, and then moving on to the next. This 
leads to a number of resource allocation problems. 
 
If one instead focused on moving every home from Highly Damaged to 
Moderately Damaged, and then to Peripherally Damaged and so on, this would 
ameliorate the problem of wasted time, as multiple 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 production functions can 
occur simultaneously. The problem here becomes a scarcity issue; 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 intensively 
uses 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾 , and there are usually only a limited number of these skilled laborers. 
Likewise, there are wasted resources, as the 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 function does not require any 𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁 or 
𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 , which are certain to be present at the time of production. These problems 
reoccur at each stage of rebuilding. 
 
It becomes apparent at this point that the optimal process for rebuilding 
should involve a mix of each production function occurring simultaneously in each 
stage of rebuilding. This leads to important tradeoff decisions; Assuming all other 
resources are unlimited, for instance, one must decide between assigning five skilled 
laborers to repair one Highly Damaged home to Moderately Damaged or to assign 
them each to repair a total of five Moderately Damaged homes to a Peripherally 
Damaged level.  
 
As no resource can possibly be unlimited or essentially unlimited at all points 
during the rebuilding phase of disaster relief, resource constraints begin to play into 
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the decision-making process. Take for example a decision made in the early stages 
of rebuilding, when funding for supplies is overwhelming and essentially unlimited, 
as is the number of untrained laborers available for work. If there are the same five 
skilled laborers, the decision to produce one Moderately Damaged home or five 
Peripherally Damaged homes comes down to whether or not there are five tools 
available for use. 
 
Furthering the Example 
Let’s return to the example of our midwestern town. Imagine a town with 16 
private homes, arranged in a four-by-four grid as such: 
A B C D 
E F G H 
I J K L 
M N O P 
Figure 3 - Representative Town Grid, Pre-Tornado 
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In equilibrium, the town has a collective stock of sixteen undamaged houses, 
each with its own level of vulnerability (in parentheses): 
A 
(4) 
B 
(3) 
C 
(1) 
D 
(3) 
E 
(2) 
F 
(1) 
G 
(2) 
H 
(4) 
I 
(4) 
J 
(3) 
K 
(4) 
L 
(2) 
M 
(3) 
N 
(2) 
O 
(1) 
P 
(3) 
Figure 4 - Representative Town Grid, with vulnerabilities 
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At time zero, a disaster pushes through, damaging a number of the homes: 
A B C D 
E F G H 
I J K L 
M N O P 
Figure 5 - Representative Town Grid, Post Disaster 
 
Those homes shaded in red (A, F, K, P) sustain High damage; those in orange 
(B, E, G, J, L, O) sustain moderate damage; those in yellow (C, H, I, N) sustain 
peripheral damage; and those in green (D, M) sustain no damage and remain in an 
undamaged state. 
 
If a federal agency such as FEMA were to arrive in town to assist in disaster 
relief, how would they go about prioritizing the rebuilding process? Remember that 
FEMA does not provide direct relief, so this is not a perfect case, but FEMA does 
provide the resources for rebuilding through grants and loans. The FEMA system 
calls for the setting of a threshold of damage, and providing resources to all 
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households whose damage breaks that threshold. If money doesn’t run out at that 
point, a lower threshold is set and the process begins again. 
 
Once a home has been shown to be above the threshold for providing aid, the 
household in FEMA’s eyes is now essentially no different from any other that has 
damaged above the threshold. In the case above, homes A, F, K, P appear to FEMA 
not much more different than they do on this page: they are all homes that have 
sustained high damage; they have no other qualities. 
 
 From this viewpoint, resource provision again becomes a simple question of 
bringing Highly damaged homes to become undamaged. Using this threshold 
system, FEMA can allot enough resources to make sure each home can be 
completely rebuilt. It leaves the coordination of these resources to the free market, 
which tends to be efficient on an individual basis, but takes a long time and is less 
efficient from a macro standpoint. 
 
On top of this, one would know that all homes and all households were not 
created equal. Just as certain groups are left more susceptible to disaster than 
others, every household has a certain level of vulnerability to disaster that makes it 
more or less resilient when a disaster hits. 
 
Reexamining our midwestern town, we realize this is the case here. Each 
household has a level of vulnerability, increasing between 1-4, that affects its ability 
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to sustain itself after a disaster. With a fuller picture, our midwestern town now 
looks like this: 
 
A 
(H, 4) 
B 
(M, 3) 
C 
(P, 1) 
D 
(U, 3) 
E 
(M, 2) 
F 
(H, 1) 
G 
(M, 2) 
H 
(P, 4) 
I 
(P, 4) 
J 
(M, 3) 
K 
(H, 4) 
L 
(M, 2) 
M 
(U, 3) 
N 
(P, 2) 
O 
(M, 1) 
P 
(H, 3) 
Figure 6 - Representative Town Grid, with Damage and Vulnerability 
 
Originally, FEMA would rank these homes in order of their level of damage, 
so that you’d have: 
 
A, F, K, P, B, E, G, J, L, O, C, H, I, N, D, M 
 
Someone from the local community would likely approach the situation 
differently. Knowing each of the affected homes well, but not fully understanding 
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how to assess damage, they would likely take the approach of ranking homes by 
vulnerability, resulting in: 
 
A, H, I, K, B, D, J, M, P, E, G, L, N, C, F, O 
 
In both cases A and K are among the first four helped, and N and C and 
among the last five. Human experience would expect this to be the case. In the case 
of ranking order by vulnerability, home P, which is highly damaged, ends up in the 
second half of repairs behind homes D and M, which although equally vulnerable are 
completely undamaged.  
 
The likely answer is that prioritization should be based on need. How does 
one determine need? Presented below are the two approaches so far: 
Order Damage Vulnerability Need 
1 A A A 
2 F H K 
3 K I P 
4 P K B 
5 B B J 
6 E D E 
7 G J G 
8 J M L 
9 L P H 
10 O E I 
11 C G O 
12 H L P 
13 I N N 
14 N C C 
15 D F D 
16 M O M 
Table 1 - Prioritization Order for Rebuilding 
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It becomes apparent that a third system, “Need” might best sort and 
prioritize these homes. Vulnerability, together with degree of damage, creates a 
level of need per household that can better be used to make decisions about 
resource provision.  
 
Need (N) in this case can be defined as such: 
 
𝑁𝑁 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐷𝐷,𝑉𝑉) 
Equation 9 
 
Where D is degree of damage (H, M, L, U) and V is vulnerability (1-4) to 
disaster. 
 
A Graphical Example 
It’s a bit easier to see now that there is a wide range of need in this situation. 
In a continued attempt to establish a triage system, it is helpful to plot these homes 
on a chart representing Need, with Vulnerability on the X-axis, and Damage on the 
Y-axis: 
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Figure 7 – Need Plotted with Quadrants 
 In this case, it becomes apparent that the best place to start is still with A 
and K, and the rest of quadrant III.  In a triage situation, where those doing the 
coordination can see both Vulnerability and Damage, this is the clear place to start, 
as it is crucial to put a family with high need back into their homes quickly.  
 
It becomes equally clear that homes in quadrant I can be saved for last. With 
low levels of damage and low vulnerability they will be alright without help for a 
while, while the resources needed to repair their homes can be devoted elsewhere. 
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With this initial triage completed, it can now be seen that the homes in quadrants II 
and IV remain to be dealt with. How does one prioritize these homes? This answer 
can only be derived by the community, based on their collective preferences for 
addressing need in each specific situation. Therefore, there exists some indifference 
curve that represents the community’s preferences, as such: 
 
 Using the approach detailed in this model, the following chapter uses case 
studies to explore various manifestations of community’s indifference curves and 
prioritization schemes, and the methods by which they make decisions and 
implement their plans. 
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Section 5: Case Studies and Examples 
 
This chapter presents a number of case studies and examines them using the 
economic model presented in the previous chapter. Specifically, it discusses at the 
resource distribution and prioritization problems facing the rebuilding phase of 
disaster relief.  Each case study presents an FBO that is organized on the local level, 
and explores strategies used by these organizations that can be used to combat 
disaster relief fatigue.  
 
ServeMoore 
 The story of ServeMoore goes like this: When the tornado ripped through 
Moore, Oklahoma, thousands of volunteers with no prior experience or training, 
appeared, ready and willing to work. The Red Cross turned them away – they only 
wanted those that were already trained, and they didn’t have the resources to train 
many more. ServeMoore, not yet a full organization, started up with a plan: Get all of 
these volunteers together to try to do something – anything. 
  
Two days after the storm had hit, the organizers of ServeMoore had close to 
5000 volunteers clear the debris out of a local cemetery in just a matter of hours. 
From that point on, the group used their local connections to optimize the 
productivity of these “unskilled” workers in a number of ways – from using large 
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numbers to complete more menial tasks quickly, to finding things that they were in 
fact skilled at. Using the local connections that the organizers had, they used other 
locally-involved volunteers to help reach out to the community and cut through red 
tape, allowing the rebuilding process to start earlier for more and more homes (M. 
Bewely and C. Fox, Personal Communication, January 9th, 2015).  
 
ServeMoore is a perfect example of how local knowledge can combine with 
external experience and resources to fill major gaps in the disaster relief system. By 
using community connections to cut through red tape, ServeMoore made extremely 
efficient use of SUVs (Spontaneous Unskilled Volunteers)10 by focusing on projects 
that were low degree and low immediacy of need – like building sheds and fences, 
which were key to helping families move back in and resume their lives.  
 
Perhaps the most significant thing that ServeMoore did was realize that due 
to a local ordinance that itself had roots in a prior tornado, residents could not move 
back into their homes, even if they were totally completed, so long as there was not 
10 Spontaneous Unskilled Volunteers (SUVs) are an industry term for good-hearted, 
well-intentioned people who show up at the site of a disaster ready to offer their 
help, but are not trained by or affiliated with any present organization, and thereby, 
when collected in mass numbers as they tend to be, become a problem to organizers 
as they have policies that prevent these unaffiliated volunteers from working under 
their organizational banner (N. Holderby and T. Layton, personal communication, 
January 7th, 2015). 
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a tree and a fence in their yard. Using its masses of volunteers, ServeMoore acquired 
the minimal funding it needed to purchase the necessary materials and tools, and 
put its workforce on the task, helping families overcome a small but significant 
obstacle in their recovery.   
  
Tying this in to the economic model presented in the previous chapter, 
ServeMoore found itself working at the bottom of the quadrant graph (Figure 7) – at 
homes that were nearly at the undamaged level. At this point, prioritization was 
easy to do because they, as local residents, were able to figure out the level of 
vulnerability of each individual home. It used what resources it had in abundance – 
unskilled labor – to make up for what it lacked in other resources, allowing it to 
work using the 𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡production function. 
 
NECHAMA 
 NECHAMA’s motto is that they’re just “guys with tools” who come in to help 
establish locally focused rebuilding and recovery solutions. NECHAMA is not local, 
and understands that it cannot have a clear picture of vulnerability; thus it is similar 
FEMA in its information, but differs in its approach. NECHAMA’s mission is to 
provide the two things that local organizations don’t have – experience and tools.  
  
NECHAMA’s model is essentially to drive a van with some experts and a 
whole lot of tools into a disaster area, provide some brief training and advice, and 
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then leave the tools to be used by the local community (B. Driscoll, personal 
communication, December 18th, 2014). These tools are often key to speeding up the 
recovery process, as tools tend to be a limiting factor. 
  
In terms of the experience it brings, NECHAMA seeks, successfully, to provide 
the local organizations that can measure and understand vulnerability with the 
information and tools they need to rate and assess damage, so as to help with the 
prioritization process. This serves as a “condensation point” for local organizations, 
around which they can begin to create systems of organization for the rebuilding 
process. 
 
St. Bernard’s Project/Rebuild Joplin 
 Rebuild Joplin formed to tackle a pretty common problem: National 
organizations did a great job clearing up debris in the city and giving out grants and 
funding to rebuild, but no one was leading the rebuilding. The St. Bernard’s Project, 
which grew out of a local response to Hurricane Katrina, sent a representative to 
Joplin to help organize a case-management system in the style that they use, and 
thus Rebuild Joplin was born. Case-management systems are used in disaster relief 
as they are in many social-services situations – to prioritize cases and to optimize 
the effects of limited resources by managing their distribution – something 
inherently important to disaster relief. 
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Rebuild Joplin’s main strength is that it uses local people to solve local 
problems. These locals, with training to understand damage assessment, use their 
knowledge of local vulnerability to help manage cases, and distribute limited 
resources over the many, many projects that face them. Due to this perfect 
combination of experience and local knowledge, Joplin shattered all expectations, 
completing its rebuilding in under three years (R. White, personal communication, 
January 7th, 2015; S Brady, personal communication, January 7th, 2015). 
 
Baptists 
The Baptist General Convention strategy of having local teams prepared to 
mobilize at any time is another key example of how a larger, national organization 
can support and help coordinate local response, while also showing how local-to-
local response can help optimize resource use during the response phase (S. 
Patterson, personal communication, January 7th, 2015). 
 
The basic framework involves each sector, down to county or even sub-
county or sub-city levels, to have its own established, dedicated response force. The 
Baptists are particularly known for their debris-removal skills, and each team has its 
own equipment, which often includes some fairly heavy machinery. By having 
multiple teams in a nearby areas, this allows quick response to local disasters, not 
only by the team assigned to that area, but by any nearby team that may be called in. 
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The hierarchical structure of the Baptist disaster relief system is loose, and 
puts much of the responsibility and decision-making on the localities themselves. 
Local teams receive training and best practices from coordinating officials “up the 
chain of command,” but must call upon their higher-ups to do any work before they 
would step in. Once called upon, however, the governing bodies can quickly and 
effectively coordinate a response, or even move higher up the chain if necessary to 
acquire more resources on behalf of the locality that needs them. 
 
Methodists 
 The Methodists, like the Baptists, are a prime example of how a larger 
national structure allows for thriving local responses. The Methodists consider 
disaster relief to be their specialty in ministry, and use a rigid hierarchical structure 
to establish systems of response. On the local level, a team of volunteers reports to a 
church-level coordinator, who reports to a town or city coordinator, who reports to 
a county-level coordinator and so on. 
  
Perhaps the most effective part of the Methodist system is that their 
organization provides multiple levels of rigorous training for volunteers. Often, 
entire congregations will have some level of training. This system guarantees that 
when a disaster hits, there will be skilled laborers ready to respond and work. 
Combined with their hierarchical system, this is why Methodist institutions tend to 
take up case-management rolls in disaster-hit communities (C. Perinunger, personal 
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communication, May 5th, 2014; M. Gaudreau, personal communication, January 8th, 
2015). 
 
Mennonites 
 The Mennonites are perhaps the best example of where local can’t do it all. 
They come in and frame as many houses as possible in a short number of days. By 
providing massive amounts of skilled labor early in the rebuilding process, they are 
able to repair a large number of highly damaged homes to a moderately damaged 
level, using the nearly unlimited amount of materials (W) that are available to them 
during that period of time. 
  
One of the lessons that usually gets passed on from disaster-hit area to 
disaster-hit area is to let, if not invite, the Mennonites to come in and do this, as they 
do it well, and they maximize the use of their resources in doing so. For a local team 
to try and coordinate, train, or teach others to do this would be a waste of time, 
resources, and energy. 
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Section 6: Conclusions  
 
 No disaster is the same, and no community is the same after being struck by a 
disaster. What worked in Moore is different than what worked in Joplin, which is 
different than what worked after Katrina, and Sandy, and Andrew. Yet it is the 
common strands in each community’s recovery that may provide direction for 
future communities. As climate chance causes disasters to occur more frequently 
and to create more damage, and as disaster relief fatigue becomes a major problem 
for our nation, we will need to find new strategies that work for communities where 
resources might be scarcer.  
  
 The lessons learned from these case studies of local FBOs can be emulated 
not only by other local FBOs, but by other local nonprofits, and even by state and 
local government. The examples and economic model presented can serve as a guide 
for local communities to optimize their recovery strategies. Whether a local church 
finds that the ServeMoore model allows them to make use of a large number of SUVs 
and a lack of skilled labor and tools; or, that in preparation for future disasters a 
statewide nonprofit chooses to create a hierarchical training and organizational 
system like that of the Methodists, what matters is that they create systems and 
solutions that can operate with minimal funding or help from the nation at large. 
 
 If just one local organization in each of our nation’s most vulnerable cities 
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can learn from these examples and create a system within which they are prepared 
to respond, the future of disaster relief may be shifting towards a brighter one. 
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